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SUMMARY
Plague, which is most often caused by the bite of Yersinia pestis-infected ﬂeas, is a rapidly
progressing, serious disease that can be fatal without prompt antibiotic treatment. In late
December 2007, an outbreak of acute gastroenteritis occurred in Nimroz Province of southern
Afghanistan. Of the 83 probable cases of illness, 17 died (case fatality 20.5%). Being a case was
associated with consumption or handling of camel meat (adjusted odds ratio 4.4, 95% conﬁdence
interval 2.2–8.8, P<0.001). Molecular testing of patient clinical samples and of tissue from the
camel using PCR/electrospray ionization–mass spectrometry revealed DNA signatures consistent
with Yersinia pestis. Conﬁrmatory testing using real-time PCR and immunological seroconversion
of one of the patients conﬁrmed that the outbreak was caused by plague, with a rare
gastrointestinal presentation. The study highlights the challenges of identifying infectious agents
in low-resource settings ; it is the ﬁrst reported occurrence of plague in Afghanistan.
Key words: Emerging infections, infectious disease epidemiology, laboratory tests, plague,
zoonoses.
INTRODUCTION
Yersinia pestis, a zoonotic bacterium that is the
causative agent of plague, is increasingly recognized
as a re-emerging threat to human and animal health
[1]. The disease is widely endemic [2] ; worldwide,
about 1000–5000 cases and 100–200 deaths per year
were reported between 1987 and 2001 [3]. In total,
24 countries reported cases in this time period, in-
cluding from Africa, Asia and the Americas. Because
detection and reporting are probably limited in most
endemic areas, this is likely to be an underestimation.
During epizootic outbreaks, the main mode of
transmission is from animals to humans through the
bite of infective ﬂeas exposed to the main zoonotic
reservoir(s), which are small mammals and rodents.
More rarely, transmission can occur from larger
mammals (e.g. camels) or through direct contact with
an infectious source or inhalation of infectious res-
piratory droplets. Plague typically manifests in three
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forms – bubonic, septicaemic, and pneumonic, de-
pending on the route of infection [4]. Clinical features
vary depending on the form, but generally include
fever, chills, malaise, hypotension, lymphadenopathy;
fatality rates of 100% in untreated cases have been
reported [4]. Plague is a notiﬁable disease and the
bacterium is considered as a potential bioterrorism
agent. Although rare, cases of plague have been re-
ported after the consumption of camel meat [5–7] ;
however, it can often be diﬃcult to determine whether
the infection occurred from the consumption of the
infected meat or by direct contact with the infectious
animal, and/or its ﬂeas, during slaughter [7]. While
plague remains endemic in parts of Asia, Africa, and
theUSA, it has never been reported in Afghanistan [8].
Detecting and responding to outbreaks of acute
diseases remains a challenge in low-resource settings,
where systems, expertise and resources are lacking.
In Afghanistan, there is a range of endemic infectious
diseases [9]. A nascent disease surveillance system –
the Disease Early Warning System (DEWS) – is cur-
rently the formal system for detection of outbreaks.
Reports of unusual outbreaks or spikes in the number
of cases presenting at clinics are reported from clinics,
hospitals and communities to the DEWS. The system
is based predominantly on syndromic descriptions for
diagnosis of disease because laboratory capacity in
Afghanistan is insuﬃcient for reliable identiﬁcation of
rare infectious diseases.
Reports of an outbreak of acute gastroenteritis
which included deaths were received by DEWS from
the provincial hospital in the southwestern Afghan
province of Nimroz in December 2007. The symp-
toms reported were fever and severe gastroenteritis
with rapid onset, in some cases including lympha-
denopathy and more rarely, pharyngeal lesions. As
reported by hospitalized victims, and conﬁrmed by
the community, just prior to the recognition of cases a
camel that was clinically ill was slaughtered and dis-
tributed among many residents of one village and
to some residents of two neighbouring villages. The
animal was reported to be visibly ill, in retrospect with
an infectious disease, exposing up to 2000 people po-
tentially. Because of this and the severity of symp-
toms, an outbreak investigation was undertaken. The
spectrum of clinical features, and the potential in-
volvement of camel meat, led to an initial hypothesis
that Bacillus anthracis was the responsible pathogen.
Human cases of gastrointestinal anthrax associated
with infected livestock have been widely reported in
the past [10].
We describe the epidemiological ﬁndings of the
outbreak investigation and the molecular detection of
Y. pestis from human clinical specimens and camel
meat.
METHODS
Study site, epidemiological investigation, and case
deﬁnition
We conducted an epidemiological investigation con-
sisting, ﬁrst, of active case detection in three villages,
and second, of a cross-sectional survey in two of
the aﬀected villages. The three villages were located
in Kang district, Nimroz province of southwestern
Afghanistan. This province is near the Iranian border
and is in an arid desert landscape.
Active case detection involved approaching com-
munity leaders and gaining their assistance in sur-
veying the villages for any person who ﬁtted the
characteristics of the outbreak – any severe gastro-
enteritis or associated symptoms; we also enquired if
patients had any contact with the camel, and if so,
what type of contact (e.g. slaughter, cooking, etc.).
Hospitals and clinics in the area and provincial capital
were also surveyed for patients from the villages and
with a history of symptoms consistent with other
cases. Cases were followed up in their homes (or in the
clinic or hospital). The number of cases with history
of fever, diarrhoea, vomiting, pharyngeal lesions,
lymphadenitis and other associated symptoms were
noted and reports of any deaths were collected in-
cluding interviews with close family members in
order to ascertain symptoms. Cases were treated with
ciproﬂoxacin, referred to hospital if necessary, and
prophylaxis, also with ciproﬂoxacin, was provided to
household members of cases.
For the second phase (the cross-sectional survey),
data were systematically collected from all households
in the most aﬀected village and a random selection
of about 50% of households in the second aﬀected
village. Houses were approached and verbal consent
was received from all participants, after which trained
ﬁeld surveyors administered a structured question-
naire. This provided information on symptoms,
treatment and potential exposure factors. A wide
range of symptoms were recorded, but the clinical
picture from cases in hospitals included fever, vomit-
ing, diarrhoea and in some cases pharyngeal lesions
and lymphadenitis as the primary descriptive symp-
toms. Exposure factors included in the questionnaire
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were: food consumption history (from the date of the
camel’s slaughter) including normal staple foods (rice,
bread, vegetables) and meats ; water source ; contact
with the slaughtered camel, including participation in
the slaughter, processing of the carcass, handling and
cooking of meat and the presence of other animals at
home. Data were noted on the forms by the surveyors
and then double-entered usingMicrosoft Access. Data
were analysed using Stata version 8 (StataCorp,USA).
At the time of the epidemiological investigation
there was no conﬁrmed causative agent so case deﬁ-
nitions were based on the primary symptoms of the
outbreak. For the epidemiological investigation, we
used two deﬁnitions of a case. A suspected case was
deﬁned as having any of fever, vomiting, diarrhoea, or
abdominal pain since the day of the camel’s slaughter;
and probable cases were deﬁned as having all of fever,
vomiting and diarrhoea over the same time period.
Since bacterial culture and identiﬁcation capacity was
low, deﬁnitive diagnoses remained unavailable at the
time of the survey.
To test the primary hypothesis that the source of
the outbreak was the camel, we examined a range of
pre-deﬁned exposure factors against the two clinical
outcomes (the case deﬁnitions). As a primary analysis,
individual potential risk factors were cross-tabulated
using x2 tests for association with each of the out-
comes (both case deﬁnitions). Multivariate logistic
regression analysis was then conducted using the same
predeﬁned exposure variables to adjust for potential
confounding between them and the outcome.
Laboratory analysis
Seven whole-blood and serum samples were collected
from three hospitalized patients. Whole blood was
cultured locally. All seven samples were subjected
to ELISA testing for evidence of Congo-Crimean
haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) and B. anthracis at the
United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
Parts of the camel were located and exhumed.
Specimens (skeletal muscle) were extracted and
transported to Kabul. Bacterial cultures of the camel
meat were conducted at the Central Public Health
Laboratory in Kabul, Afghanistan.
Subsequently, sera and whole blood from three of
the non-fatal human cases (patients 1–3), along with
samples of the remaining camel meat were analysed
using broad-range PCR/electrospray ionization–mass
spectrometry (PCR/ESI–MS), followed by real-time
PCR. DNA was extracted from all patient samples
and camel meat using the QIAamp DNA extraction
kit (Qiagen, USA) according to the manufacturer’s
instructions. Extracted DNA from all samples was
analysed using PCR/ESI–MS on the Ibis T5000 plat-
form. This system is a multiplexed detection format
which uses broad-range PCR followed by speciﬁc
pathogen identiﬁcation by mass spectrometry to de-
termine the amplicon’s unique base composition sig-
nature [11]. The speciﬁc assay used for this analysis
was the Biodefense Bacterial and Viral Surveillance
kit (Abbott Molecular Inc., USA), which targets 13
bacterial and four viral biothreat agents and dis-
tinguishes them from their near neighbours in a single
assay format.
Conﬁrmatory testing was performed using three
LightCycler (RocheDiagnostics, USA) real-time PCR
assays previously developed for detecting Y. pestis
[12]. These assays speciﬁcally target the genes for the
pesticin immunity protein (pim), plasminogen acti-
vator (pla), and the capsular antigen F1 (caf1), which
are known virulence factors speciﬁc for Y. pestis.
IgG and IgM enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays
(ELISA) were performed on patient sera as previously
described [13, 14]. Both ELISAs were designed to
detect antibodies speciﬁc for the Y. pestis F1 antigen.
Titres reported are equal to the reciprocal of the last
dilution that is above or equal to the optical density
cut-oﬀ value, and samples were considered positive if
their titre waso100.
RESULTS
Epidemiology
The outbreak was reported over 15 days in the villages
following the slaughter of the camel on 16 December
2007. Camel meat had been distributed to 150–200
families. Fifty cases were found in the active case-
detectionphaseof the investigation,witheight reported
deaths all of which came from the village where the
camel was slaughtered (Burrida). These deaths re-
portedly included three members of the same family
who had slaughtered the camel, including the butcher.
A total of 607 persons were enrolled in the cross-
sectional survey and included 382 suspected cases and
83 probable cases (Table 1). All residents of Burrida
(comprising 30% of the sample) and 50% of the
second village (Shandro) were surveyed.
Of the probable cases, 17 had died with reported
symptoms consistent with the disease, giving an
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estimated case-fatality rate of 20.5%. Exposure vari-
ables were examined by univariate and multivariate
analysis against each of the case deﬁnitions. Among
the food consumption risk factors, eating camel meat
was the only factor positively associated with being
a case. Of those who had consumed camel meat,
253/347 (72.9%) were suspected cases vs. 129/260
(49.6%) in those who had no history of consumption
(x2=34.6,P<0.001). Consumption of cowmeat (beef)
was negatively associated with disease in suspected
cases [84/225 (37.3%) in non-cases vs. 83/382 (21.7%)
in suspected cases ; x2=17.3, P<0.001]. This associ-
ation is probably because those who consumed cow
meat (beef) were less likely to have consumed camel.
Of those who consumed camel meat, 64/347 (18.4%)
were probable cases vs. 19/260 (7.3%) who had no
history of consumption (x2=15.6, P<0.001).
Other associated exposure factors for suspected
cases were cooking camel meat : 79/92 (85.9%) were
cases vs. 303/515 (58.8%) who did not cook camel
meat (x2=24.5, P<0.001), although there was no as-
sociation with these two factors and being a probable
case. Any exposure to camel meat, through eating,
handling, cooking or slaughter was associated with
being a suspected case and a probable case (Table 2).
No association was found with other foodstuﬀs or
water source. Age group was negatively associated
with being a probable case (adjusted odds ratio 0.6,
95% conﬁdence interval 0.5–0.8).
Laboratory conﬁrmation
The initial bacterial culture of camel meat, conducted
in Kabul, was inconclusive and although it yielded
bacilli, they could not be identiﬁed to species level.
In retrospect these probably represented soil con-
taminants since the meat had been buried prior to
being exhumed for submission to the laboratory.
Blood culture of patients produced no growth; how-
ever, patients had been treated with ciproﬂoxacin
prior to sampling which may have cleared any bac-
teraemia.
After the outbreak had concluded, in May 2008
samples of blood (n=2) (acute samples from patients
1 and 2) and sera (n=3) (convalescent samples from
patients 1–3) were tested at USAMRIID. The initial
ELISA tests for Bacillus anthracis and CCHF virus,
as well as bacterial and viral culture attempts, were
uniformly negative.
Three patients and one sample of camel meat sub-
jected to further analysis with the PCR/ESI–MS assay
detected the presence of DNA signatures consistent
with Y. pestis in both an acute whole-blood specimen
from patient 1 and in the camel tissue (Fig. 1a, b).
All three Y. pestis-speciﬁc primer pairs that are in-
corporated into the PCR/ESI-MS assay, targeting the
inv, pla, and caf genes, were positive for both samples
and produced identical base composition signatures
in the patient specimen and the camel tissue (Fig. 1c).
Y. pestis DNA was not detected in blood or sera from
patients 2 and 3.
As further conﬁrmation of the presence of Y. pestis
is these samples, we used three LightCycler (Roche
Diagnostics) real-time PCR assays previously devel-
oped for detecting Y. pestis. These assays target the
virulence factor genes, pim, pla, and caf, of Y. pestis.
As with the PCR/ESI–MS analysis, real-time PCR
testing targeting all three genes showed that the acute
whole-blood specimen from patient 1 and the camel
tissue were strongly positive for the presence of
Y. pestis (Table 3). Furthermore, acute blood and
convalescent sera (taken y1 month after the out-
break) from patients 1 and 2 and convalescent serum
from patient 3 were tested for the presence of IgM and
IgG antibodies speciﬁc to the F1 antigen of Y. pestis
using ELISAs. While patient 1 did not have any
antibodies to Y. pestis, convalescent serum of patient
2 had both IgM and IgG anti-F1 antibodies (Table 3).
The acute serum sample from this patient was nega-
tive, providing evidence for seroconversion and, thus,
recent infection with Y. pestis. Convalescent sera from
patient 3 also had positive IgG titres to F1; however,
because it was IgM negative and no acute sample was
available, we cannot rule out the possibility that this
result represents antibody from a previous exposure.
Table 1. Enrolment characteristics of the cross-
sectional survey sample
Total sample size, N 607
Male, % 50.6%
median age, years (IQR) 13 (5–25)
Age group, years, n (%)
0–5 165 (25.7%)
6–10 116 (19.1%)
11–20 144 (24.5%)
>21 186 (30.6%)
Village, n (%)
Shandro 424 (69.9%)
Burrida 183 (30.2%)
No. persons/household (95% CI) 7.5 (7.2–7.8)
Suspected cases, n/N (%) 382/607 (63.0%)
Probable cases, n/N (%) 83/607 (13.7%)
IQR, Interquartile range ; CI, conﬁdence interval.
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DISCUSSION
In humans, infection with Y. pestis typically occurs
from the bite of an infected ﬂea and manifests in one
or more of three clinical forms: bubonic, septicaemic,
or pneumonic. We describe the epidemiology of
an outbreak of severe gastrointestinal disease in
Afghanistan after the consumption of camel meat in
late 2007. We provide laboratory evidence that this
was a rare outbreak of gastroenteritis caused by the
bacterium Y. pestis, which probably resulted from the
consumption of infected camel meat. Those who had
contact with the camel were also at elevated risk, but
the primary public health concern was for the wide-
spread distribution of the camel meat where several
hundred individuals were found (in our sample) to be
exposed. We were not able to identify the infectious
agent until several months after the outbreak but the
epidemiological data strongly implicated consump-
tion and exposure to camel meat as the route of
transmission. Because the outbreak was limited in
time, the response focused on treatment of those
aﬀected using active case detection. Plague was not
identiﬁed in time to put in place conventional control
mechanisms (ﬂea and rodent control), although this
would not have been appropriate because of the un-
usual route of transmission.
While human plague is most often acquired from
the bites of infected ﬂeas, rare sporadic cases due to
exposure to infected carcasses of camels and other
Table 2. Multivariate logistic regression analysis of potential pre-speciﬁed risk factors against the two primary
outcomes in the study
Suspected cases Probable cases
Exposed, n (%) Multivariate analysis Exposed, n/N (%) Multivariate analysis
Disease
(n=382)
No disease
(n=225) aOR 95% CI P
Disease
(n=83)
No disease
(n=524) aOR 95% CI P
Age group
>5 years
279 (73.0) 172 (76.4) 1.0 0.9–1.2 44 (53.0)# 407 (77.7) 0.6 0.5–0.8 <0.001
Sex (male) 203 (53.1)* 97 (43.1) 1.3 0.9–1.9 47 (56.7) 260 (49.6) 0.7 0.4–1.1
Village
(Burrida)
118 (30.9) 65 (28.9) 0.6 0.4–1.0 28 (33.7) 155 (29.6) 1.0 0.5–1.8
Contact
with camel
(not meat)
2 (0.9) 4 (1.1) 2.3 0.4–13.7 2 (2.4) 4 (0.8) 7.7 1.1–54.9 0.04
Contact$
with camel
meat
258 (67.5)# 96 (42.7) 3.3 2.2–5.1 <0.001 65 (78.3)# 289 (55.5) 4.4 2.2–8.8 <0.001
Contact$
with other
meat (not
camel)
369 (96.6) 221 (98.2) 0.3 0.1–1.1 80 (96.4) 510 (97.3) 0.5 0.1–2.3
Eating other
food (not
camel meat)
330 (86.4) 188 (83.6) 1.4 0.8–2.4 72 (86.8) 446 (85.1) 1.3 0.6–2.7
History of
travel
208 (54.5)# 148 (65.8) 0.9 0.6–1.4 39 (47.0)# 371 (60.5) 1.2 0.7–2.1
Sick animal
at home
276 (72.3)# 136 (60.4) 1.6 1.1–2.3 0.01 59 (71.1) 353 (67.4) 1.3 0.7–2.2
Death of
household
member
28 (7.7)# 5 (2.3) 2.9 1.0–8.1 0.04 3 (3.7) 30 (5.9) 0.5 0.1–1.8
aOR, Adjusted odds ratio, using pre-speciﬁed potential confounding factors in a logistic regression model ; CI, conﬁdence
interval.
* x2 : P<0.05.
# x2 : P<0.01.
$ Eating, handling, cooking, and/or slaughter.
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animals have been documented [15]. In particular, in
more recent times, the consumption of camel meat
was implicated in human plague cases from, Jordan
[5], Saudi Arabia [6] and Libya [7]. Although no
severe pharyngitis, tonsillitis or pharyngeal lesions
were observed in the Afghan patients, gastrointestinal
symptoms such as vomiting, diarrhoea, and abdomi-
nal pain suggested ingestion as the route of exposure.
Outbreaks of this nature are rare, but are often severe
in nature. The infected camel in this case reportedly
had an open, ulcerated lesion on its hock, so it seems
likely that it contracted plague from the bite of an
infected ﬂea somewhere along the route of its journey,
possibly days to weeks before the outbreak. It was not
possible to track the camel’s journey with any ac-
curacy, so the possible location of infection could not
be ascertained. Once infected, the camel had become
clinically ill but was slaughtered and the meat dis-
tributed widely. Cooking practices may explain dif-
ferential exposure and thorough cooking almost
certainly would have limited the outbreak. A special-
ity of rare-cooked camel is evident in this region, and
while some may have prepared the food in this way,
most of it would have been cooked thoroughly. Those
who were closely associated with the slaughter and
handling of the camel meat, including cooking, had
elevated risk of disease and death. The attack rate in
patients who had cooked the meat wasy80%.
Detection of the outbreak via the Afghanistan
DEWS allowed a rapid response to be mounted. Part
of the response was to conduct the investigation and
to ensure that patients were adequately treated. The
disease was correctly presumed to be infectious by the
treating physicians, and speciﬁcally bacterial. Thus,
cases were appropriately treated with ciproﬂoxacin
and appeared to respond. In light of the rarity of
Table 3. Summary of diagnostic testing on patient specimens and camel tissue from the 2007 Afghan outbreak
Patient no. Sample
PCR/
ESI–MS
Real-time PCR (Ct)* ELISA
caf1 pim pla IgM IgG
1 Whole blood/acute Pos. 33.6 30.9 30.0 <100 <100
1 Serum/convalescent Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. <100 <100
2 Whole blood/acute Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. <100 <100
2 Serum/convalescent Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. 400 6400
3 Serum/convalescent Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. <100 1600
Camel tissue n.a. Pos. 25.2 23.1 22.7 n.d. n.d.
caf1, Capsular antigen F1; pim, pesticin immunity protein ; pla, plasminogen activator ; n.a., not applicable ; n.d., not
determined.
* Crossing point.
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Fig. 1. PCR/ESI–MS analysis of patient and camel samples.
Spectra of the amplicons resulting from PCR targeting the
Y. pestis caf gene from an (a) acute whole-blood specimen
collected from patient 1 and (b) camel meat. (c) Base
compositions (A, T, G, C) resulting from PCR of the
Y. pestis-speciﬁc genes, inv, pla, and caf showing identical
base compositions within the gene targets between the two
samples.
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plague as the cause of such an outbreak, diagnosis of
the infectious agent would have been challenging
under any circumstances, and was more of a challenge
in the context of Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Thus,
the working hypothesis that the outbreak was the re-
sult of anthrax was not disproved until several months
after the initial outbreak. This identiﬁes the challenge
of detecting infectious agents in low-resource settings
if the disease is uncommon and case presentation is
unusual.
All bacterial culture attempts from patients’ blood
and camel tissue were negative or only yielded con-
taminants, and few samples were available for testing;
the key to identifying the causative agent in this out-
break was the use of the Ibis T5000 PCR/ESI–MS
assay. This diagnostic tool has previously been shown
to detect a broad range of bacterial pathogens [16, 17]
and several viruses [18–20]. The inclusion of certain
key gene targets in the Ibis T5000 biodefence assay
allows it to detect and identify a wide range of
pathogens in potentially complex clinical or environ-
mental samples with little or no background eﬀect.
Speciﬁcally, three of the gene targets included in this
multiplexed assay are the pim, pla, and caf genes of
Y. pestis. All three of these targets were positive in the
acute whole-blood specimen from patient 1 and the
camel tissue (Fig. 1c). Follow-up testing using real-
time PCR conﬁrmed these results, and immunological
testing indicated seroconversion to Y. pestis F1 anti-
gen in patient 2.
The presence of Y. pestis has not been reported
from Afghanistan previously, despite reports from
neighbouring countries [8]. A number of zoonotic
diseases causing acute outbreaks of disease threaten
the inhabitants of Afghanistan and the surrounding
region, including CCHF and now plague. Thus,
enhanced disease surveillance eﬀorts and improved
laboratory diagnostic capabilities are required to
mitigate the eﬀects of outbreaks of acute diseases.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we described the ﬁrst reported occur-
rence of plague in Afghanistan. In this outbreak of
disease, illness was strongly associated with con-
sumption of camel meat. Using epidemiological
analysis and a novel PCR/ESI–MS assay, real-time
PCR, and immunological analysis of diagnostic
specimens from both patients and camel tissue, we
provided strong evidence that the 2007 Afghanistan
outbreak was due to plague and that consumption
of Y. pestis-infected camel meat was the source of
the infection. Enhanced detection and surveillance
mechanisms, including improved laboratory diag-
nosis capacity, is required for identiﬁcation of rare
outbreaks of acute disease in developing countries.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Tamara Clements for conducting the
ELISAs. Laboratory research was funded, in part, by
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir,
VA. Fieldwork was funded by WHO Kabul and
United States Naval Medical Research Unit no. 3,
Cairo, Egypt. The opinions, interpretations, con-
clusions, and recommendation are those of the
authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the U.S.
Army or any other associated agency.
DECLARATION OF INTEREST
None.
REFERENCES
1. Prentice MB, Rahalison L. Plague. Lancet 2007; 369 :
1196–1207.
2. Stenseth NC, et al. Plague: past present and future.
PLoS Medicine 2008; 5 : e3
3. World Health Organisation. Human plague in 2000 and
2001. Weekly Epidemiological Record 2003; 78 :
253–260.
4. Worsham PL, et al. Plague. In : Lenhart MK,
Lounsbury DE, Martin JW, Dembek ZF, eds. Medical
Aspects of Biological Warfare. Washington, DC:
Borden Institute, 2007, pp. 91–119.
5. Arbaji A, et al. A 12-case outbreak of pharyngeal
plague following the consumption of camel meat, in
north-eastern Jordan. Annals of Tropical Medicine and
Parasitology 2005; 99 : 789–793.
6. Bin Saeed AA, Al-Hamdan NA, Fontaine RE. Plague
from eating raw camel liver. Emerging Infectious
Diseases 2005; 11 : 1456–1457.
7. Christie AB, Chen TH, Elberg SS. Plague in camels
and goats : their role in human epidemics. Journal of
Infectious Diseases 1980; 141 : 724–726.
8. Stenseth NC, et al. Plague: past, present, and future.
PLoS Medicine 2008; 5 : e3.
9. Wallace MR, et al. Endemic infectious diseases of
Afghanistan [Review]. Clinical Infectious Diseases 2002;
34 (Suppl. 5) : S171–207.
10. Sirisanthana T, Brown AE. Anthrax of the gastro-
intestinal tract. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2002; 8 :
649–651.
734 T. Leslie and others
11. Ecker DJ, et al. Ibis T5000: a universal biosensor ap-
proach for microbiology. Nature Reviews Microbiology
2008; 6 : 553–558.
12. Christensen DR, et al. Detection of biological threat
agents by real-time PCR: comparison of assay per-
formance on the R.A.P.I.D., the LightCycler, and the
Smart Cycler platforms. Clinical Chemistry 2006; 52 :
141–145.
13. Duermeyer W, Wielaard F, van der Veen J. A new
principle for the detection of speciﬁc IgM antibodies
applied in an ELISA for hepatitis A. Journal of Medical
Virology 1979; 4 : 25–32.
14. Iacono-Connors LC, et al. Enzyme-linked immuno-
sorbent assay using a recombinant baculovirus-
expressed Bacillus anthracis protective antigen (PA) :
measurement of human anti-PA antibodies. Clinical
Diagnostic Laboratory Immunology 1994; 1 : 78–82.
15. WerneryU,KaadenO-R. InfectiousDiseases inCamelids,
2nd edn. Berlin : Blackwell Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2002.
16. Baldwin CD, et al. Usefulness of multilocus polymerase
chain reaction followed by electrospray ionization
mass spectrometry to identify a diverse panel of bac-
terial isolates. Diagnostic Microbiololgy and Infectious
Diseases 2009; 63 : 403–408.
17. Postinikova E, et al. Identiﬁcation of bacterial plant
pathogens using multilocus polymerase chain reaction/
electrospray ionization-mass spectrometry. Phytopath-
ology 2008; 98 : 1156–1164.
18. Eshoo MW, et al. Rapid and high-throughput
pan-Orthopoxvirus detection and identiﬁcation using
PCR and mass spectrometry. PLoS ONE 2009; 4 :
e6342.
19. Eshoo MW, et al. Direct broad-range detection of
alphaviruses in mosquito extracts. Virology 2007; 368 :
286–295.
20. Sampath R, et al. Global surveillance of emerging
Inﬂuenza virus genotypes by mass spectrometry. PLoS
ONE 2007; 2 : e489.
Gastrointestinal plague in Afghanistan 735
